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Abstract
The Bitcoin transaction graph is a public data structure organized as transac-
tions between addresses, each associated with a logical entity. In this work, we
introduce a complete probabilistic model of the Bitcoin Blockchain. We first for-
mulate a set of conditional dependencies induced by the Bitcoin protocol at the
block level and derive a corresponding fully observed graphical model of a Bitcoin
block. We then extend the model to include hidden entity attributes such as the
functional category of the associated logical agent and derive asymptotic bounds
on the privacy properties implied by this model. At the network level, we show ev-
idence of complex transaction-to-transaction behavior and present a relevant dis-
criminative model of the agent categories. Performance of both the block-based
graphical model and the network-level discriminative model is evaluated on a sub-
set of the public Bitcoin Blockchain.
1 Introduction
Analysis of the Bitcoin Blockchain [26] is an area of intense activity [20, 1], and one
which has witnessed an explosion of interest as the value of the Bitcoin cryptocur-
rency has skyrocketed. Research areas include explorations of address clustering tech-
niques to identify logical agents [11, 21, 11, 7], de-anonymization using side-channel
attacks [8, 13].
An understanding of the properties of Bitcoin transactions is paramount to the legit-
imation of the cryptocurrency economy; it constitutes a building block to the concep-
tion of effective and adequate regulations [9], and to the design of novel and integrated
services benefiting society as a whole.
As of 2018, with more than 500 million address nodes, the Bitcoin graph is compa-
rable in size to a large social network. Yet while probabilistic models of social networks
have received considerable attention, from community detection [19] to diffusion mod-
els and influence maximization [34], to probabilistic graph modeling [17], probabilistic
models of the Bitcoin Blockchain network have not.
1
ar
X
iv
:1
81
2.
05
45
1v
1 
 [c
s.C
R]
  7
 N
ov
 20
18
Bitcoin transactions are tantamount to a partially observed social network, within
which participants can have multiple seemingly independent aliases. This distinguishes
our work from classical studies on partially observed social networks, typically focused
on partial observations of interactions due to sampling [10], and makes it closer to the
vast body of work on entity resolution [31, 4].
A second challenge associated with modeling the Bitcoin Blockchain transaction
network consists of capturing the complexity of the hidden structure associated with
entity transactions, together with the fine-grained block-level specificities implied by
the Bitcoin protocol. In particular, Bitcoin is based on an unspent transaction output
(UTXO) model, which distinguishes suitable Bitcoin Blockchain models from prior
studies on credit card transactions [6, 18], since the proper generative structure needs
to account for the underlying UTXO creation and deletion process.
In this work, we propose a first attempt at a comprehensive model of the Bitcoin
transaction graph using a hybrid generative-discriminative model attempting to draw
strengths from both approaches [27]. We first define pragmatic conditional indepen-
dence assumptions underlying the Bitcoin protocol, and formulate a generative model
of the Bitcoin Blockchain block. In this context, we analyze the revealed entity be-
havior, both theoretically and from a data perspective. We then turn to network level
modeling, present a discriminative model of transaction-transaction behavior, and ana-
lyze the associated medium-term categorical agent behavior.
2 Probabilistic block model
A Bitcoin transaction consists of a set of input addresses transferring BTC to a set
of output addresses. More specifically, in the context of a transaction, each input ad-
dress contributes a possibly fractional subset of its UTXOs to the creation of the set
of UTXOs associated with output addresses, for the same total amount (minus a fee).
Each UTXO is associated with an address, and each address is associated with a logical
agent, who may hold an arbitrary number of addresses, see Figure 1.
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Figure 1: Bitcoin address-transaction bipartite graph data structure of visible ad-
dresses ai, (associated with unknown entities ei), (left) with each arrow corresponding
to an unspent transaction output (UTXO), and corresponding hidden entity-transaction
graph (right). A block consists of many such transactions. A change address, here a1,
may be used to return the remainder of the UTXO.
We embed the Bitcoin Blockchain transaction graph in a directed bipartite graph
structure G = (A ,T ,E ), with the following vertex and edge features:
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• address vertex a ∈ A : number of UTXO kUTXOa , and out-degree kouta ,
• transaction vertex t ∈ T : transaction value v and fee f ,
• directed address-transaction edge ∈ E : outgoing value v from address a via
transaction t,
• directed transaction-address edge ∈ E : incoming value v to address a via trans-
action t.
Since the Bitcoin protocol specifies that transactions should be validated in blocks and
the proof-of-work consensus protocol incentivizes validators to agree on a single block-
chain, we ignore transient disagreements and assume a discrete-time simple path struc-
ture of blocks.
We propose a stationary graphical model [33] of a Bitcoin Blockchain block. First
we develop a fully observable block-transaction, address (BT-A) model, illustrated in
Figure 2, that we then augment with entity attributes into a block-transaction, entity-
address (BT-EA) model with more complex structure.
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Figure 2: Block-transaction address model, plate notation. Observed random vari-
ables are shaded while non-observed variables are plain.
2.1 Block-transaction address model
A block b is composed of the set of transactions t validated by the peer node who
solved the cryptographic challenge the fastest. With the approximation of stationary
inter-block time, and assuming independence between the ability of solving the cryp-
tographic challenge and the selection of transactions, we model the number Tb of trans-
actions per block as a Poisson distribution. Similarly assuming stationary and indepen-
dent address usage, we model the number of input addresses It and output addresses
Ot per transaction as a Poisson random variable.
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Definition 1 (Transactions, input and output addresses).
∀b ∈ B, Tb ∼P(λsize)
∀t ∈ T , It ∼Pn(λin) and Ot ∼Pn(λout), (1)
wherePn is the normalized Poisson distribution on N∗.
On the receiving end of a transaction, it is possible to generate a new address.
In the Bitcoin pseudonymous context, this reduces the traceability of the full set of
transactions associated with an entity. Considering the set of output addresses as a
whole, we model the conditional distribution of the number of new addresses given the
number of output addresses as a Binomial random variable.
Definition 2 (New address distribution).
∀t ∈ T , Nt|Ot ∼ B(Ot, pnew). (2)
In the interest of a tractable inference procedure, and in the absence of an infor-
mative prior, in this work we focus our efforts on maximum-likelihood estimation, and
assume uniform prior λsize, λin, λout, pnew.
We now proceed to describe the generative model of the input and output ad-
dresses. A natural choice for the generative hierarchical model is the LDA or Dirichlet-
multinomial model used in topic modeling [5, 24]. Here, given the full observability
of the model variables and decomposability of the likelihood, motivated by topological
social network analysis, we use the Albert-Barabasi preferential attachment model [2],
which can be seen as the posterior probability of an LDA model in the appropriate
feature space.
Specifically, we consider that the probability of the ith address Ai to be a given
address a is proportional to the number of available UTXO of the address. The model
reads as follows.
Definition 3 (Input addresses). ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , It}
P(Ai = a|kUTXO) = k
UTXO
a + 1∑
a′∈A (k
UTXO
a′ + 1)
(3)
where A is the set of available addresses, kUTXOa is the number of unspent outputs of
the address.
The output address model is similar, except that the attachment model is now con-
sidered a function of the out-degree of the address, i.e. while the inclination of the
address to be part of the inputs (i.e. to spend) is considered to be a function of the
number of UTXOs it has still available, the inclination of the address to be part of the
outputs (i.e. to accumulate) is considered to be a function of the number of distinct
UTXOs it has already spent.
Definition 4 (Output addresses). ∀o ∈ {1, . . . , Ot}
P(Ao = a|Nt, kout) ∼1(o ≤ Nt; a = a0) (4)
+ 1(o > Nt)
kouta + 1∑
a′∈A (k
out
a′ + 1)
where a0 denotes a new address.
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For each input address, since empirically we observe that the UTXO distribution
is concentrated around 1, we model the conditional distribution of the number Ui of
UTXOs used given the number of UTXOs available as a geometric random variable
with uniform prior. We then draw the UTXOs uniformly from the available set.
Definition 5 (Input UTXOs).
∀i ∈ {1, . . . , It}, Ui|kUTXOAi ∼ G[1,...,kUTXOAi ](pUTXO,in)
∀u ∈ {1, . . . , Ui}, Vi,u|Ui ∼ U{1,...,kUTXOAi } (5)
where G[1,...,kUTXOAi ]
is the normalized geometric distribution with support [1, . . . , kUTXOAi ],
and where U{1,...,kUTXOAi }
is the uniform distribution over the set {1, . . . , kUTXOAi }.
We obtain the total transaction value Vt as the sum of the input UTXOs.
Definition 6 (Transaction value).
Vt|It, Ui, Vi,u =
∑
1≤i≤It
∑
1≤u≤Ui
Vi,u. (6)
A fee is paid to the miners to reward their validation work and higher fees may
nudge their selection of transactions when creating blocks. We thus model the fee as-
sociated with a Bitcoin transaction as a normalized Gaussian distribution. The number
of output UTXOs and their values is modeled similarly to the input UTXOs.
Definition 7 (Fee value, output UTXOs).
∀t ∈ T , Ft|Vt = N[0,Vt](µfee, σfee)
∀o ∈ {1, . . . , Ot}, Uo ∼ G (pUTXO,out)
∀u ∈ {1, . . . , Uo}, Vo,u|Vt, Ft ∼ U[1,...,Vt−Ft] (7)
whereN[a,b] denotes the Gaussian distribution normalized over the interval [a, b], and
where U denotes the normalized uniform distribution (the Vo,u are also normalized in
order to sum to V (t)− F (t)).
The resulting block-transaction address model (1)-(2)-(3)-(4)-(5)-(6)-(7) is pre-
sented in Figure 2.
We now turn to a more complex variant of the proposed model meant to capture
categorical behavior of the unobserved entities transacting on the Blockchain.
2.2 Block-transaction entity-address model
An entity e is associated with a Bitcoin user and fully characterized by a set of addresses
A(e) = {a(e)i }i. In this section we extend the BT-A model to take into account cate-
gorical entity behavior. We assume that entities belong to different categories c ∈ C ,
with potentially different behaviors.
We first model the fact that the hyper-parameters λin and λout associated with the
number of input and output addresses, depend on the category c of the associated entity,
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and are noted λin,c and λout,c. Similarly the parameter associated with the number of
new addresses in the output pnew,c, and the number of UTXO in the input pUTXO,in,c
and output pUTXO,out,c are category-dependent.
Second we update the conditional independence structure of the generative model
to reflect the fact that address selection (3)-(4) is now also conditioned on entities.
Definition 8 (Input and output entities and addresses).
P(Et = e|kUTXO) = k
UTXO
e + 1∑
e′∈E (k
UTXO
e′ + 1)
P(Ai = a|kUTXO, Et) = 1(a ∈ A(Et)) (k
UTXO
a + 1)∑
a′∈A ,a∈A(Et)(k
UTXO
a′ + 1)
P(Eo = e|kout) = k
out
e + 1∑
e′∈A (k
out
e′ + 1)
(8)
P(Ao = a|kout, Eo) = 1(o ≤ Nt; a = a0)
+ 1(o > Nt)
1(a ∈ A(Eo)) (kouta + 1)∑
a′∈A ,a∈A(Eo)(k
out
a′ + 1)
.
This dependency structure intending to capture the behavior of distinct categories
of entities is illustrated in Figure 3.
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Figure 3: Block-transaction entity-address model, including category-specific vari-
ables, as well as hidden entities. As per the protocol, all input addresses are associated
with only 1 entity, while output addresses are generally associated with multiple enti-
ties.
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2.3 Model inference
We assume a known dependency structure and estimate the model parameters. Since
the prior is decomposable over nodes, and since all variables are observed in the BT-A
model, the MLE inference amounts to local computation over each node and its parents.
Regarding the BT-EA model, while the hidden entity variables make the inference
more complex in general, here we assume that a separate heuristic such as the multi-
input heuristic [7] allows associating each address with an entity, hence the inference
process over the labeled set reduces to the scalable process used for the BT-A model.
3 Block-level privacy analysis
In this section we present an analysis of address re-use behavior in the context of the
probabilistic model introduced in the previous section, as well as implications of these
results for Bitcoin transaction anonymity.
3.1 Attacker model
We model an attacker, attempting to identify the full set of addresses A(e) associated
with an entity e. We assume that the attacker uses the standard multi-input heuristic [7],
which associates the full set of address inputs for each transaction to a single entity and
applies transitive closure. From the perspective of the external attacker, the true set of
addresses A(e) of an entity e is partitioned into Ae aliases, a-priori seen as distinct
entities;
A(e) =
⋃
1≤i≤Ae
A(e)i,
where A(e)i denotes the address set associated with alias i of entity e. In this setting,
when participating in a transaction t on the input side, we consider that the targeted
entity e selects {Nin,i}1≤i≤Ae addresses from its available set following a generic
multinomial distribution with parameters {pi}1≤i≤Ae , which includes the special case
for which the alias distribution is a linear function of kUTXO.
This models the typical Bitcoin user who, while being concerned by his privacy, is
not particularly careful about address selection, and uses multiple distinct aliases with
distinct address sets, but sometimes mixes these address in the same transaction input,
leading to a privacy collapse.
Given the multi-input heuristic, it is indeed sufficient for an attacker to observe two
addresses from distinct aliases and to associate these two aliases to the same entity
using the multi-input heuristic. Formally, upon observing the input addresses from a
transaction t associated with input entity e, the attacker is able to associate the follow-
ing address set with entity e:
{a ∈ A(e)i ∪A(e)j |1(Nin,i > 0; Nin,j > 0), 1 ≤ i, j ≤ Ae}.
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3.2 Privacy analysis
In the following for simplicity we consider a one-step iteration and assume that the
attacker is only aware of the set of addresses associated with alias A(e)1. In this sense
the control parameter p1 plays the role of 1-pnew from the BT-EA model. We analyze
the number De,t of addresses from entity e that the attacker is able to discover after
seeing the addresses involved in 1 transaction, expressed as:
De,t =
Ae∑
i=2
|A(e)i|1(Nin,i > 0; Nin,1 > 0).
We can express the number of discovered addresses De,t as a function of the alias
addresses selection probabilities pi.
Proposition 1 (Privacy loss from address re-use).
E[De,t] =
1− exp (−λin,cp1)
1− exp (−λin,c)
Ae∑
i=2
|A(e)i|(1− exp (−λin,cpi)) (9)
Proof. By definition of De, t, we have
E[De,t] =
Ae∑
i=2
|A(e)i|P(Nin,i > 0 ∧Nin,1 > 0|Et = e).
Let B be the second factor in the summation term, by marginalizing over It and using
the chain rule, we can write:
B = P(Nin,i > 0 ∧Nin,1 > 0|Et = e)
=
∑
n≥1
P(Nin,i > 0 ∧Nin,1 > 0|Et = e, It = n)
P(It = n|Et = e).
Letting C denote the first factor in the summation term above, we have:
C = P(Nin,i > 0 ∧Nin,1 > 0|Et = e, It = n)
=
∑
ni>0,n1>0,
∑Ae
j=1 nj=n
P({Nin,j = nj}j |Et = e, It = n)
=
∑
ni>0,n1>0,
∑Ae
j=1 nj=n
n!∏Ae
j=1 nj !
Ae∏
j=1
p
nj
j
where the last equality is obtained by definition of the multinomial distribution.
Similarly since the number of input addresses It follows a binomial distribution we
have:
P(It = n|Et = e) =
λnin,c
n!(exp (λin,c)− 1) ,
and combining this expression with the expression ofC, we can simplify the expression
of B to finally obtain equation (9), which concludes the proof.
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With p1 as the control parameter, the expression states that the attacker information
gain is an exponential function of the probability of using addresses already identified
(i.e. address re-use). The asymptotic behavior of a privacy-conscious user is described
next.
Proposition 2 (Privacy-conscious asymptotics). If p1  pi we have:
E[De,t] ∼ λin p1(|A(e)| − |A(e)1|).
This result shows that the one-step information gain from the attacker is a lin-
ear function of the probability of using already-used addresses, and also linear in the
number of addresses typically used as input. This result at the transaction level can
be readily extended to a chain-length estimate by accounting for the probability of
an entity to transact, as provided explicitly in equation (8) of the BT-EA model. We
also highlight that while a low p1 models a privacy-conscious user, the user strategy is
non-adaptive, in the sense that the user does not try to adjust his strategy based on the
attacker strategy.
4 Probabilistic transaction graph model
We now consider the behavior of entities across transactions, and assume that entity
categories exhibit different behaviors. Given the lack of a-priori underlying modeling
structure to this behavior, and given the combinatorial nature of such behavior, we pro-
pose a discriminative framework in which model selection can be carried out more
efficiently based on a possibly large set of relevant features. We rely on the classi-
cal multi-input heuristic [7] for defining entities, and formulate a decision-tree based
classification problem in the following feature space.
4.1 Feature space
We consider the following five feature classes, and for continuous features explicitly
consider the feature mean and standard deviation; address features, entity features, tem-
poral features, graph centrality metric features, motif features.
Address-specific features include attributes such as the total BTC received, the total
BTC balance, the number of input/output transactions, etc. Analogous features are de-
fined at the entity level as well as the number and proportion of Coinbase transactions
(indicative of BTC creations).
Temporal features are those such as the number of weeks, months, years of ac-
tivity. the number of entity traded with per week, month, year, the number of receiv-
ing/sending/receiving sending days, the activity period duration, and the active day
ratio.
Motif features are presented in Figure 4. Here we consider 1, 2, and 3 motifs, ex-
tending the 2-motifs from [30]. Motifs are a comprehensive description of the transaction-
to-transaction properties.
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Figure 4: 2-motif features (rectangular white boxes) annotated over a 2-motif. A N-
motif is a path of length 2N on the bipartite entity-transaction graph. We distinguish
Direct motifs from Loop motifs, the latter indicating that an entity is transacting with
itself using distinct addresses.
5 Experiments
In this section we present numerical results of our probabilistic Bitcoin Blockchain
model. We first describe the training procedure for the generative block model and
discuss obtained model parameters. We then turn to the transaction-to-transaction dis-
criminative model results and analyze the properties revealed by the joint analysis.
5.1 Dataset
We consider the set of blocks of height inferior or equal to 514.971, corresponding to
blocks created before March 24th 2018, 15:19:02, which contains about 500.000.000
addresses. Address labels, revealing entity identifiers, are obtained from WalletEx-
plorer https://www.walletexplorer.com/. The set of address entity label
pairs used has been made available at https://github.com/Maru92/EntityAddressBitcoin.
We interact with the Blockchain via the BlockSci toolbox v.0.4.5 released on March
16th 2018 [15], on a 64 GB machine. The final labeled dataset used in numerical ex-
periments consists of 28.353.493 addresses, associated with |Eknown| = 260 entities
representing 4 entity categories in the following proportions:
• Exchange (E): 108 entities, 7.892.587 addresses,
• Service (S): 68 entities, 17.606.608 addresses,
• Gambling (G): 65 entities, 2.775.810 addresses,
• Mining Pool (M): 19 entities, 78.488 addresses.
When training the probabilistic model, we restrict ourself to the period from January 1st
2016 to March 16th 2018, where overall patterns are relatively stationary. Indeed since
the proposed model is static we do not attempt to study its ability to model transient
regimes. We observe UTXO statistics in Table 1 and UTXO distribution in Figure 5,
showing wide variability across multiple scales.
5.2 Transaction subset modeling
Since we consider a subset of the transaction graph, we need to model transactions
originating from our subset and directed outside it, or vice-versa. We follow the pro-
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Quantity E S G M All
mean µ(Vu,o) 8.62 0.53 0.11 1.27 4.39
std σ(Vu,o) 93.1 41.6 0.81 4.25 70.0
Table 1: UTXO empirical statistics in BTC: the UTXO output values have a large
standard deviation compared to their mean, and vary significantly across entity cate-
gories.
Figure 5: BTC UTXO distribution : 1 minus the cdf of the UTXO represented in log
log coordinates, with 99.9% of the distribution qualitatively following a power law on
the interval [10−3, 103].
posed model structure and model the number of external output addresses as a Pois-
son distributionP(λsub). Transactions from unknown addresses towards known input
addresses are modeled with no known input and a number of transactions per block
Tb,incoming following a Poisson distribution P(λsize,sub). Coinbase transactions are
created in a similar manner: no inputs, number of addresses in the outputs drawn fol-
lowing a Poisson distribution of parameter λout,sub, with new addresses, pnew,sub, and
several UTXOs created per addresses, pUTXO,out,sub.
5.3 Block model training
We train the model using data from the period January 1st 2016 to March 16th 2018
consisting of about 10 million addresses. We first verify the main independence as-
sumption, between the number of input addresses and the number of output addresses.
Since ρpearson(It, Ot) = 0.015, we consider the marginal independence hypothesis
validated.
The inference produces a value λsize = 65.6 for both models. In Table 2 we present
the model parameter results from the model training for the BT-A and BT-EA models.
The results reflect the idiosyncratic properties of Bitcoin Blockchain transactions,
with for instance the need to gather UTXOs from various addresses, which is illustrated
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Parameter BT-EA BT-A
E S G M All
P (Et = e) 0.33 0.55 0.09 0.03 1
λin 3.79 2.58 1.98 21.2 2.99
λout 0.68 1.96 0.21 7.04 1.21
pUTXO,in 0.95 0.92 0.84 0.67 0.92
pUTXO,out 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
pnew 0.23 0.20 0.47 0.55 0.26
Table 2: Model parameters from calibration on the period from January 1st 2016 to
March 16th 2018, for the Exchange, Services, Gambling, Mining Pool categories.
by the fact that λin > λout. It is also clear from the UTXO parameters that the input
parameters are more discriminative than the output parameters, which reflect transfers
from other parties from the perspective of the entity concerned.
Lastly we observe significant address generation distinctions across entity cate-
gories, with Gambling and Mining Pools seemingly more privacy-conscious given their
higher probability of generating new addresses. They also transact less frequently, us-
ing more input addresses. Detailed impact of entity behavior on privacy properties is
analyzed subsequently.
5.4 Block model testing
In order to assess the model performance, we now evaluate out-of-sample model ac-
curacy. Starting from scratch, we train the model on 4911 blocks corresponding to the
period from January 1st 2017 to January 31st, 2017, and evaluate the model on 2150
blocks associated with the period from February 1st, 2017, to February 14th, 2017.
Metric BT-EA BT-A
E S G M All
MSE 1.22 -0.30 -0.02 0.06 1.12
RMSE 125 53.3 1.15 5.19 90.5
MAE 15.6 0.94 0.20 2.42 7.47
RMAE 1.82 1.74 1.86 1.93 1.69
NRMSE 1.34 1.28 1.42 1.22 1.29
Table 3: Error statistics in BTC for UTXO output values Vu,o: from the BT-A level
overall value, as well as per category from the BT-EA model, for the Mean Signed Error
(MSE), Mean Absolute Error (MAE), Root Mean Squared Error (RMSE), Relative
Mean Absolute Error (RMAE) and Normalized Root Mean Squared Error (N-RMSE)
expressed as RMSE divided by σ(Vu,o).
The results from Table 3 illustrate that given the multi-scale nature of the underly-
ing distributions, the model estimates are relatively close on average, i.e. well within
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an order of magnitude. Furthermore, the BT-EA model significantly reduces the bias
(MSE) as well as the variance (RMSE) for most categories. The Exchange category
is the only one for which both bias and variance increase, suggesting a fundamental
modeling limitation.
The error terms are relatively large in absolute terms for both models, which is
largely explained by the inherent variance in the data, both at the population level and
at the class level. Indeed, the bias is low and most of the data variance is explained,
with a N-RMSE ranging between 1.22 and 1.34.
5.5 Privacy analysis validation
Given the calibrated model parameters, we now validate experimentally the theoretical
privacy properties of Bitcoin Blockchain transactions expressed by equation (9). We
leverage the generative model and attacker model described above to simulate transac-
tion traces and evaluate the proportion of the addresses that are re-identified for distinct
categories, as a function of the number of transactions.
Figure 6: Proportion of identified addresses: by category, as a function of the number
of transactions.
Figure 6 shows agreement between the analytics results and the simulation of the
block model. The figure also illustrates that Exchanges and Services typically are less
privacy-conscious (lower probability of generating new addresses, frequent transac-
tions), and hence for an equivalent number of Blockchain transactions, typically reveal
a greater proportion of their address set.
Transaction anonymity however depends also on the transaction-to-transaction be-
havior. Indeed, it is conceivable that certain entities, while not following best block-
level practices on address re-use, hence easily identifiable as entities, could be trans-
acting in a way that little information is gathered from their network level transaction
structure. In order to assess the latter, we now turn to the numerical results of our pro-
posed network transaction model.
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5.6 Transaction network model
We use the Python LightGBM implementation of the gradient boosted decision tree
model [16] with a 70/30 training/test partition of our dataset. A Gaussian Process
(GP)-based optimization procedure for hyper-parameter optimization is implemented
using the Python skopt library https://scikit-optimize.github.io/with
initial parameter values obtained from a coarse random search. The learning rate hyper-
parameter is optimized over the interval [0.01, 0.5] with early stopping after having
done a random search over [0, 2]; the resulting value is 0.18. The GP procedure is used
with 50 iterations.
We make use in total of 10 address features, 8 entity features, 16 temporal fea-
tures, 42 centrality features, 44 1-motif features, 81 2-motif features, and 114 3-motif
features. We present in Table 4 the F1, Accuracy and Precision results over the entire
dataset and for each category.
Category Accuracy F1 Precision
Exchange 0.94 0.92 0.91
Gambling 0.95 0.97 1.00
Mining 0.50 0.67 1.00
Service 0.95 0.88 0.83
Overall 0.92 0.91 0.92
Table 4: Classification performance: for the 4 entity categories considered, and over-
all.
The results illustrate that the model is able to very well capture the behavior of
most entity categories. Furthermore, the network-level privacy analysis confirms the
prior block-level analysis, with Mining Pools being the most privacy-conscious. In-
deed, considering the most relevant features of the LightGBM model, in a 1 vs. all
setting, it appears that for most categories except the Mining Pool, motif features are
the most informative, indicating that the LightGBM model is not able to leverage the
transaction sub-graph for identification of the Mining Pool category.
6 Related work
Heuristics for clustering multiple addresses to an entity have been studied in [21] and
consistent address re-use patterns have been shown in [11]. The authors of [3] attempt
to detect Ponzi schemes.
Analysis of the Bitcoin protocol in the context of attacks have been proposed, for
instance inference of peer-to-peer communication structure, in [8], statistical analysis
of bloom filters in [28], and analysis of Bitcoin minting patterns in [22] with application
to de-anonymization. Flow-based address-transaction graph studies can be found in
[23, 12, 29]. The obfuscation of Bitcoin transactions traceability has been considered
in [25].
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Several studies have applied discriminative models to the problem of de-anonymizing
Bitcoin transactions, with for instance the use of transaction-specific features in [32],
able to achieve 70% accuracy for classifying entities into several types. In [30], the
authors introduce transactions paths with application to the detection of Bitcoin ex-
changes, and achieve greater than 80% accuracy. Similar transactions paths features
are used in [14] for a 5-class classification problem with above 90% accuracy results.
7 Conclusion
In this work, we proposed a probabilistic model of the Bitcoin Blockchain which ac-
counts for the complex Bitcoin protocol features. The model consists of a hierarchical
structure from unspent transaction output (UTXO), to address, transaction, and block.
We take into account entity modeling, including features relevant for robustness to de-
anonymization attacks, namely address re-use patterns. We also propose a discrimina-
tive model of transaction-to-transaction behavior and show its effectiveness in practice.
We analyzed the accuracy of the generative model using a large Bitcoin dataset
of more than 10 million address vertices, discussed the significant block-level hetero-
geneity of the model parameters across entity categories, and provide a complementary
analysis of transaction-to-transaction behavior using the discriminative model. We con-
sider in particular the de-anonymization properties of certain behaviors, which is one
of the main focus areas of Bitcoin studies.
Extensions of this work may include the design of more complex graphical models
including latent variables for modeling transaction intent, and shared side-information
across entities, inducing multivariate preferential attachment. A significant challenge
for such models with more complex dependency structure and hidden variables is the
design of a tractable training and inference procedure given the large-scale nature of
such public cryptocurrency transaction graphs.
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